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Segregation of Duties (SOD) can be seen as one major class of control activities within a 
company's Internal Control framework, contributing to the reliability of financial reporting. In 
recent years, SOD controls in terms of user access rights have experienced a surge of attention in 
particular, mostly due to the growing reliance of business processes on ERP systems. This paper 
presents a method for automatically identifying SOD conflicts in user access rights as one 
component of a continuous compliance monitoring framework. The paper further demonstrates the 




In recent years, the growing number of corporate scandals (e.g. Barings Bank, Enron, Worldcom, 
Siemens, Société Générale) has led to tighter regulatory and statutory requirements regarding a 
company's Internal Control over Financial Reporting (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley-Act). According to the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), Internal Control 
can be defined as "a process, effected by an entity's board of directors, management and other 
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the 
following categories: 1. Effectiveness and efficiency of operations. 2. Reliability of financial 
reporting. 3. Compliance with applicable laws and regulations" [6]. To ensure the achievement of 
these objectives, COSO proposes the implementation of a company-wide Internal Control 
framework consisting of five interrelated components: Control Environment, Risk Assessment, 
Control Activities, Information and Communication, and Monitoring [6]. The need for 
implementing a suitable and available Internal Control framework is also underlined by the 
aforementioned regulatory and statutory requirements [12]. 
 
Within a company's Internal Control framework, Segregation of Duties (SOD) can be classified as a 
major class of control activities. It contributes to the reliability of financial reporting [13] by 
preventing any single employee from having complete control over all phases (authorization, 
custody, record keeping and reconciliation) of a business transaction [15, 18], thus, avoiding a 
conflict of interests and preventing fraud [13, 14]. The term "fraud" is used in accordance with the 
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International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 240 and refers to "an intentional act by one or more 
individuals among management, those charged with governance, employees, or third parties, 
involving the use of deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage" [14]. If a company's Internal 
Control is not working effectively due to inadequate SOD, then fraudulent activities, such as 
misappropriation of assets and fraudulent financial reporting, may not be prevented which, in turn, 
could result in a material misstatement in the financial statements of the respective company [14]. 
According to a survey recently published by the accounting and consulting firm 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the average loss from fraud over two years per company in 2007 
was US$ 2,420,700 [16]. 
 
Considering the relevance of SOD for the effectiveness of a company's Internal Control over 
Financial Reporting, this paper proposes a method for identifying existing SOD conflicts in the user 
access rights of different enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems. From our practical 
experience, there is a strong demand for such a monitoring method, especially due to the growing 
reliance of business processes on ERP systems [9] and the latest corporate scandals (e.g. the 
Siemens AG has lately chosen Security Weaver as its global software platform for monitoring SOD 
conflicts2). While the continuous monitoring of SOD conflicts in ERP systems combined with the 
continuous monitoring of system transactions and system settings is recently marketed under the 
term "continuous compliance monitoring" by several consulting firms, such as PwC and KPMG, 
and software vendors, such as ACL CCM, Approva BizRights and Security Weaver, there seems to 
be a lack of scientific debate regarding continuous monitoring methods. This paper tries to fill this 
gap and is based on the Design Science paradigm [11]. The proposed method addresses a relevant 
business problem (see introduction) and constitutes a viable artefact according to Hevner et al. 
Research rigor is achieved by applying the established method engineering approach within the 
construction process. The practicability of the method is then evaluated in a real world project. The 
research contribution of the paper can be seen in bridging the gap between the practical and 
theoretical debate regarding continuous compliance monitoring.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In chapter 2, the method engineering approach 
is presented as the theoretical foundation of the method development process. Based on the 
understanding of the five constituent elements of a method (activities, outcomes, techniques, roles 
and metamodel), chapter 3 focuses on describing the most important elements of our proposed 
method for identifying SOD conflicts in system-based user access rights (activities, outcomes and 
techniques). Thus, the elements metamodel and roles will not be covered within this paper. In 
chapter 4, the method is evaluated by applying it in a real world project. Finally, a conclusion is 
given and further research needs are outlined. 
 
2. Method Elements and Method Engineering  
 
According to Brinkkemper, the word method comes from the Greek "methodos", meaning way of 
investigation [4]. In the context of systems development, he defines a method as "an approach […] 
based on a specific way of thinking, consisting of directions and rules, structured in a systematic 
way in development activities with corresponding development products" [4]. Further definitions of 
methods have been given, for example, by [1], [2], [8] or [18]. A synopsis of these and other 
definitions can be found at [3] who derive four fundamental defining attributes of a method: goal 
oriented, systematically structured, principles-based, and intersubjectively repeatable. 
                                                 




Method Engineering (ME) is an approach which has emerged in the IS field in the nineteen-eighties 
due to the "fundamental observation […] that no one method is equally suitable to all kinds of 
problem domains" [19]. Based on this observation, ME can be understood as an engineering 
discipline which focuses on the systematic design, construction and adoption of methods for various 
purposes (e.g. information systems development) [7]. Here, a method is not conceived "as a single 
intertwined and interdependent entity but as a set of disparate fragments" [10].  
 
Gutzwiller has analyzed several ME approaches and derived the following five general elements of 
a method: "activity", "role", "outcome", "technique", and "metamodel" [8]. Again, an overview of 
alternative definitions can be found at [3]. According to Gutzwiller, an activity is a functional unit 
of action which aims at creating one or more defined outcomes (e.g. a functional specification). 
Activities may consist of sub-activities (forming a hierarchical structure) and can be ordered in a 
sequence (procedure model). Techniques describe in detail how a certain outcome or a group of 
logically interrelated outcomes is created. The metamodel is the conceptual data model of the 
outcomes and visualizes their overall interrelationships. Finally, roles are aggregations of certain 
activities required to fulfil a certain function within the company and are normally performed by 
employees or organizational units [8].  
 
Based on the aforementioned understanding, the following chapter focuses on describing the 
activities, outcomes and techniques of our method for identifying SOD conflicts in ERP-systems as 
well as the interrelationships of these elements. Neither metamodels nor role aspects will be 
covered in this paper. The application of the method in a real world project is demonstrated in 
chapter 4.  
 
3. Activities, Outcomes and Techniques of the Method  
 
The activities, outcomes and techniques of the proposed method are illustrated in Fig. 1.   
  
 





The process scoping activity is the starting point of the presented method and aims at identifying 
those processes which will later be subject to the SOD analysis. This selection should be based on a 
thorough assessment of each process in terms of the probability of fraud occurrence and the 
expected extent of such events. Typical examples of high risk processes in most companies are the 
purchase-to-pay process (P2P) or the order-to-cash (O2C) process. Assessment techniques, like 
interviews and questionnaires, should especially take into account the complexity of a certain 
process, such as degree of automatization and interfaces, past fraud cases, existing opportunities to 
commit fraud (e.g. ineffective controls), as well as employees' incentives (e.g. existing pressure, 




The aim of the process analysis activity is to gain a thorough understanding of the selected 
processes by decomposing each process in its flow of activities and by identifying the 
organizational entities and information systems (e.g. ERP systems) which are involved in 
performing these activities. Techniques that should be used for gathering the required information 
are interviews, questionnaires and observations. Process modelling tools (e.g. IDS Scheer ARIS, 
BOC ADONIS) might be used in order to facilitate the systematic creation of the process models. 
 
SOD Ruleset Specification 
 
The main objective of the third activity is to specify the corporate SOD ruleset which constitutes the 
total set of SOD conflicts considered relevant for the regarded processes. An SOD conflict is 
defined as a combination of exactly two process activities which hold the risk of fraud if both are 
performed by the same individual. SOD conflicts are relevant if both the probability of their 
exploitation and the expected damage resulting from such an exploitation exceed a threshold 
depending on a company's risk appetite [5]. This threshold ensures the manageability of the ruleset 
by eliminating all non-relevant conflicts. The conflicts contained in the ruleset should be formulated 
in a system-independent way which guarantees that the ruleset is overall applicable and not tailored 
to a specific system environment. This becomes especially important when dealing with more than 
one company (e.g. an affiliated group) and different system environments (e.g. SAP, Baan). An 
exemplary extract of a ruleset is given in Tab. 1.  
 
Process SOD Conflict Risk 
P2P Create & Maintain Vendor 
Records vs. Process Vendor 
Invoices 
A user could set up fictitious vendor accounts (or 
alter existing accounts inappropriately) and create 
fictitious invoices resulting in unauthorized 
payments. 
P2P Process Vendor Invoices  vs. 
Process Outgoing Payments 
A user could process payments for fictitious or 
invalid invoices. 
P2P Create & Maintain Vendor 
Records vs. Process Outgoing 
Payments 
A user could set up fictitious vendor accounts (or 
alter existing accounts inappropriately) and initiate 
payments to these fictitious vendors.  
Tab. 1: Exemplary extract of a SOD ruleset for the P2P process 
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SOD Ruleset Translation 
 
The next activity of the proposed method is based on the premise that all or most of the process 
activities considered in the SOD ruleset (e.g. "Create & Maintain Purchase Order") are actually 
performed in an ERP system, thus requiring the translation of the system-independent ruleset in the 
specific transaction codes, function codes, authorization objects, etc. of the respective system. 
Again, this activity becomes particularly important when dealing with several subsidiaries of an 
affiliated group which all perform basically the same processes (e.g. P2P) on heterogeneous ERP 
systems (e.g. SAP, Oracle Financials, Baan). In such a case, the ruleset must be consistently tailored 
to each ERP system. A practical example is given in paragraph 4.3.  
 
Live Data Extraction and Transformation 
 
After having translated the SOD ruleset, the fifth activity aims at extracting the current user access 
rights from the relevant database tables of the productive ERP systems and transforming that data in 
a standardized format for analysis purposes. In order to automate the extraction, the implementation 
of customized Standard Query Language (SQL)-scripts which may be triggered periodically is 
recommended. The first step in creating such a script consists of identifying the relevant database 
tables which contain the user access rights data. In an ERP system supporting purely role based 
access rights, the tables illustrated in Tab. 2 should be considered at minimum. 
 
Table Description 
User Master Data Contains all users of the system 
Transaction Master Data Contains all possible business transactions supported by the system 
Role Master Data  Contains all roles defined in the system 
Mapping Users To Roles Contains all relationships of users and roles. A role can be assigned to 
multiple users and a user can have multiple roles (m:n). 
Mapping Roles to 
Transactions 
Contains all relationships of roles and business transactions. A role can 
contain multiple business transactions and a transaction can be assigned 
to multiple roles (m:n).  
Tab. 2: Relevant user access rights tables in a role based access rights system 
The automated transformation of the contents of the identified tables in a standardized format by 
using appropriate SQL queries can then be seen as the second step. However, in the case of ERP 
systems whose authorization mechanisms are not purely role based, additional data transformations 
must be developed. Typical issues which might be encountered are: (1) access rights are directly 
assigned to users without using roles or in addition to existing roles; or (2) roles do not only contain 
business transactions (positive list), but also entries with explicit negations of transactions (negative 
list). In such cases, constellations must be considered where one role grants one user access to a 




Within this activity, the standardized data extracts from the previous step are taken and analyzed in 
order to determine existing SOD conflicts in the user access rights assigned for the productive ERP 
systems. For each user and each conflict of the translated SOD ruleset, it must be checked if the 
respective user disposes of sufficient access rights to perform both activities of the analyzed 
conflict. In such a case, the result report of the SOD analysis should show the existing conflict 
together with additional information (e.g. user ID, conflicting access rights) to allow the 




4. Application of the Method in a Real World Project 
 
This chapter aims at demonstrating the application of the proposed method in a real world project. 
Firstly, a short overview is given describing the objectives and the general requirements of the 
project. Subsequently, the aforementioned activities, techniques and outcomes are described in the 




In the forefront of our project, the client had started to implement a continuous SOD compliance 
process based on the analysis tool Security Weaver (SW). Although SW is primarily focussed on 
SAP installations, the scope of the software was extended within the project to cover other NON-
SAP systems (e.g. Exact Globe, Baan, Oracle Financials) as well. At the end, more than 60 
worldwide located installations of NON-SAP systems were integrated in the automated SOD 
compliance process. The activities performed in order to analyze the user access rights within those 
systems are illustrated in Fig. 2 and described below: (1) the current user access rights are extracted 
from each productive NON-SAP system on a regular basis; (2) the extracted data is transformed in a 
common standardized format; (3) the standardized data is transferred to the central SW instance 
(e.g. via FTP), uploaded and analyzed; (4)/(5) the results are made accessible via web interface 































Fig. 2: Activities within an exemplary continuous SOD compliance process 
In the context of the overall SOD project, the main objective of our sub-project was to initially 
analyse the user access rights established in the productive NON-SAP systems of several selected 
subsidiaries with regard to existing SOD conflicts. The scope of the analysis was further limited to 
cover only P2P-related conflicts as well as some conflicts relating to the finance and the system 
administration process. 
  
SOD Ruleset Specification 
 
The SOD ruleset for the P2P process had already been defined by our client and, thus, marked the 
initial point of our sub-project. To obtain the ruleset, the client first identified all relevant activities 
performed within his P2P processes and then created an SOD matrix based on these activities to 
derive the potential conflicts. Tab. 3 shows an excerpt of the SOD matrix for the P2P process. The 




 CMVR PVI POP MBA PIP 
CMVR   - X X     
PVI       X -  X     
POP      X X  - X   
MBA         X  - X 
PIP              X  - 
Tab. 3: Exemplary SOD matrix for the P2P process3 
SOD Ruleset Translation 
 
The system-specific translation of the P2P ruleset is demonstrated on the example of the NON-SAP 
system Exact Globe. Within Globe, the table "pwfunc" contains all transactions supported by the 
system. Tab. 4 shows an extract of this table. 
 
transactionID exename Transactiontitle 
650888               EBUDGETALLOCATION         Budgets                                                          
650892               BALANCELIST                      Receivables history                                             
650896               BALANCELIST                      Payables history                                                
650925               ENTRYREPORT                      To be processed                                                 
652065               EFENTRY                          Invoices                                                         
652066               EFENTRY                          To create credit notes                                          
Tab. 4: Extract of transactions supported by Exact Globe 
To translate a specific conflict of the SOD ruleset, it is necessary to identify all transactionIDs 
contained in the table "pwfunc" which logically belong to one of the two activities that make up a 
conflict and assign those transactionIDs to the respective activity. It is immediately obvious that this 
activity requires a profound knowledge of the regarded ERP system and the transactions it supports. 
Tab. 5 illustrates the process activity "Process Vendor Invoices" tailored to Exact Globe. 
 
Process activity TransactionID GroupID Transaction Title 
Process Vendor Invoices G0000000018 08 Exchange rates                                        
Process Vendor Invoices G0000000054 NO Transactions                                            
Process Vendor Invoices G0000000062 NO Financial entries                                      
Process Vendor Invoices G0000000060 04 Enter                                                       
Process Vendor Invoices G0000000068 NO Make recurring purchase entries             
Process Vendor Invoices G0000000063 NO Make recurring general journal entries   
Process Vendor Invoices G0000000121 07 Invoices & Bank/Cash                            
Process Vendor Invoices G0000000102 08 Invoices & Bank/Cash                            
Process Vendor Invoices G0000000119 04 Process                                                   
Process Vendor Invoices G65047 NO Purchase                                                  
Process Vendor Invoices G65076 NO General journal                                       
Process Vendor Invoices G65303 07 Exchange rates                                        
Tab. 5: Exemplary translation of the activity "Process Vendor Invoices" 
It should be noted that a user needs only one of the transactionIDs marked with a "NO" in the 
GroupID column of the table above to perform the activity "Process Vendor Invoices" within Exact 
Globe ("or"-conjunction). On the other hand, values other than "NO" in the GroupID column point 
out that a user must possess all transactionIDs belonging to the same group in order to be able to 
                                                 
3 Legend of abbreviations: Create & Maintain Vendor Records (CMVR), Process Vendor Invoices (PVI), Process 
Outgoing Payments (POP), Maintain Bank Accounts (MBA), Process Incoming Payments (PIP) 
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perform the activity "Process Vendor Invoices". In the case of group "04", only entering AND 
processing invoices is deemed critical. Users with access to only one of these transactions cannot 
perform the activity "Process Vendor Invoices" on their own. 
 
Live Data Extraction and SOD Analysis 
 
For obtaining the user access rights data from the productive NON-SAP systems, customized SQL 
scripts were created and implemented. The data transfer was performed using standardized csv-
files. The access rights data contained in the files was then uploaded into the central SW instance. 
Subsequently, the analysis of the user access rights data in terms of existing SOD conflicts was 
performed automatically in SW by applying the appropriate system-specific SOD ruleset to the 
uploaded data. A simplified exemplary result report showing one identified SOD conflict 
("Maintain Vendor Records vs. Process Vendor Invoices") for the user "4711" is depicted in Tab. 6. 
The report also indicates the transactionIDs causing the conflict, the roles of the user containing the 
conflicting transactionIDs and the respective process activities to which the transactionIDs have 
been mapped. Based on the report, the existing conflict could be solved, for example, by revoking 
the user's access to transactionID 650476. 
 
Company User Conflict Process Activity Role Transaction-ID 
100 4711 
Maintain Vendor Records vs. 






Maintain Vendor Records vs. 






Maintain Vendor Records vs. 





Tab. 6: Simplified report of identified SOD conflicts 
At higher organizational levels, more aggregated reports are commonly demanded (e.g. existing 
SOD conflicts over all entities). Fig. 3 shows a scatter plot which we used within our project for 
reporting the initial status of SOD conflicts in several selected entities (C001 to C007) and the 
status after a first remediation (visualized via arrows) to the client's management. 
 
 
Fig. 3: SOD report graph showing the number of conflicts per entity (C001 to C007) 
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While the scatter plot in Fig. 3 shows only the total number of SOD conflicts for each entity, the 
graph in Fig. 4 gives more detailed information on the frequency of each single conflict. On the x-
axis of the graph, the analyzed conflict IDs are shown (e.g. AP01 to AP15), whereas the y-axis 
indicates the percentage of ERP system users within the regarded entities (C001 to C007) having 
the respective conflict. A broken line occurs if a conflict is not applicable to the considered system. 
 
 
Fig. 4: SOD report graph showing the frequency of each conflict per entity 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper proposed a method for identifying existing SOD conflicts in the user access rights of 
different ERP systems. The method consists of six interrelated activities whose practicability was 
evaluated in a real world project. From this evaluation, some "lessons learned" can be derived: 
 
1. The creation of a complete, accurate and consistent SOD ruleset without redundancies is highly 
important as it constitutes the basis for all subsequent activities. Thus, an independent quality 
assurance assessment of the ruleset should be performed prior to any implementation activities. 
2. The system-specific translation of the ruleset demands highly experienced system users to 
ensure the accuracy and completeness of the mapping. Again, an independent quality assurance 
assessment has proved to be important. 
3. In the case of ERP systems whose authorization mechanisms are not purely role-based, 
additional support tools for transforming the data into the required format had to be developed. 
These additional efforts should be considered when planning similar projects. 
4. The redesign of user access rights in order to ensure compliance with the SOD principle may 
result in a substantial change of organizational work routines, e.g. if employees are not allowed 
to perform certain activities in the ERP systems anymore due to existing SOD violations. These 
required changes should be taken into account when starting an SOD project.  
The presented method constitutes a first step towards a comprehensive continuous compliance 
monitoring framework that addresses the particularities of complex ERP systems. Further research 
should focus on developing sound methods that can be used to automatically monitor system 
transactions and system settings. Due to the fact that issues with segregation of duties usually stem 
from a complex interaction of technical and non-technical activities that are usually not properly 
reflected in the master data of an ERP system alone, further research should also concentrate on the 
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